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Abstract 
Most studies of renminbi internationalization focus mainly on the supply side, by 
examining China’s own economic and political conditions related to it. This study in 
contrast addresses the demand-side of renminbi internationalization, by providing an in-
depth analysis of renminbi use in ordinary foreign economies from both economic and 
political perspectives, with a particular focus on South Korea, China’s next-door neighbor. 
It finds that sustainable indigenous market forces facilitating renminbi use in South Korea 
remain weak, despite the country’s close economic ties with China. This research also 
shows, however, that the Korean government has itself recently been able, through its 
policy measures, to generate new domestic vested interests supporting greater use of the 
renminbi. These findings ultimately highlight the significant impact on the 
internationalization of a currency of the politics in the foreign countries using it. 
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I. Introduction 
 
Since the outbreak of the 2008-09 global financial crisis the Chinese authorities have 
employed a variety of policy measures to actively promote internationalization of their own 
currency, the renminbi (RMB), in pursuit of multiple goals including the reduction of 
China’s reliance on the US dollar (henceforth, the dollar), the strengthening of its 
international influence and the acceleration of its domestic financial reforms.1 As a result, 
although its absolute level is still quite low global use of the RMB has grown remarkably 
within just a few years, with the rank of the RMB’s share in total global payments for 
instance jumping from 20th in the world in January 2012 to seventh in September 2014.   
 Along with this impressive progress in RMB internationalization, research on the subject 
has also exploded in recent years. Most studies share two common elements. In analyzing 
the factors that affect RMB internationalization they tend to provide supply-side analyses, 
focusing on China’s own economic and political conditions. In examining the level of 
RMB internationalization, meanwhile, they tend to rely mainly on either the aggregate data 
of RMB use at the global level or the data of RMB use in Hong Kong.     
Such analysis of RMB internationalization is undoubtedly necessary and important. It 
has a critical limitation, however, in that it pays little attention to the actual uses of the 
                                                 
1 The Chinese authorities have not officially announced the goals of RMB internationalization. A good 
number of studies have however attempted to identify them. See, for example, Kirshner (2014), Mallaby and 
Wethington (2012) and Yu (2014). Meanwhile, for Chinese government policies to promote RMB 
internationalization, see Eichengreen and Kawai (2014), Subacchi (2013) and Yu (2014).  
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RMB in foreign economies, especially ordinary foreign economies that, unlike Hong Kong 
for example, have neither unique political relations with China nor international financial 
centers. In fact, the supply-side analysis of RMB internationalization usually addresses the 
costs and benefits of using the RMB from the Chinese perspective only, rather than from 
foreign users’ perspectives. This is a serious shortcoming, however, as RMB 
internationalization ultimately requires the use of the RMB by non-Chinese. The heavy 
reliance on the aggregate data of global RMB use or the data on RMB use in Hong Kong is 
also problematic, since it hinders analysis of the uses of the RMB in individual foreign 
economies, which vary across countries. Moreover, the dynamics of RMB use in ordinary 
economies may differ from those in international financial centers or in economies with 
special political relations with China, while a consequential level of RMB 
internationalization is unlikely to be achieved without growth in RMB use in such ordinary 
economies. It is therefore necessary to explore the uses of the RMB in ordinary foreign 
economies, in order to better understand the factors affecting RMB internationalization—
and, going further, currency internationalization in general—and to better forecast the 
future of RMB internationalization.    
In this context, this study provides a demand-side analysis of RMB internationalization 
by addressing the use of the RMB in ordinary foreign economies, with the specific focus 
being the case of South Korea (henceforth, Korea). Its primary goal is to draw valuable 
insights from its in-depth analysis of the Korean case for future use in the analysis of RMB 
internationalization as well as currency internationalization in general, rather than to 
develop a formal theory of currency internationalization or to rigorously test competing 
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hypotheses. This research is thus close to a hypothesis-generating study. And it is also 
distinct in that it offers a comprehensive study of RMB use in the case country by analyzing 
both the economic and the political dynamics surrounding it.  
This research argues that strong indigenous market forces supporting sustainable use of 
the RMB have not emerged yet in Korea, even despite its close economic relations with 
China. It also holds, however, that political forces are likely to boost RMB use in the 
country. More specifically, it argues that the Korean government has effectively 
implemented the infrastructures essential for simulating RMB use even in the absence of 
strong private sector demand for them and, going further, that it has been able to generate 
the emergence of new domestic vested interests supporting greater use of the RMB, by 
creating through its policy measures novel incentives for them to favor it. These findings 
ultimately suggest that, at least in the early stage of internationalization of a currency, the 
growth of its use in ordinary foreign economies is likely to be significantly affected by the 
domestic politics involving those economies themselves, as well as by economic and 
political conditions in the issuing country.  
Korea is selected as the primary research case in view of the considerable advantages it 
offers for the analysis of RMB internationalization. First, the geographical area in which 
RMB internationalization is most likely to develop in its initial stage is Asia (it is in fact 
widely suspected that the Chinese authorities aim to develop the RMB into a regional 
currency in Asia first), and Korea is one of the major countries in that region as well as 
China’s next-door neighbor. Korea moreover has strong economic ties with China, as will 
be discussed in detail later. In these circumstances, the use of the RMB in Korea may have 
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significant implications for the future of RMB internationalization, with a high level of 
RMB use in that country suggesting a positive future for it and a low level implying the 
opposite. In addition, this study’s focus on the case of a single country enables it to conduct 
a more in-depth analysis of that case. Indeed, this research examines the use of the RMB in 
various areas, including for trade settlement, as private investment assets and as foreign 
exchange reserves, thereby providing a balanced and systematic assessment of RMB use in 
Korea.  
In analyzing RMB use in Korea, this study adopts mainly qualitative analysis, including 
the investigation of government documents and in-depth interviews with policymakers and 
experts in various relevant institutes such as the Ministry of Strategy and Finance (MOSF), 
the Bank of Korea (BOK), the Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA), the 
Korea International Trade Association (KITA), the Korea Center for International Finance 
(KCIF), the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP), the Korea Institute 
of Finance (KIF) and the Korea Capital Market Institute (KCMI), as well as major private 
banks both domestic and foreign-owned. 
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section highlights the need 
for a demand-side study of RMB internationalization. The following two sections address, 
respectively, the economic and the political aspects of RMB use in Korea. The final section 
concludes, discussing this study’s major implications.  
 
II. Need for demand-side analysis 
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The literature on RMB internationalization deals primarily with its feasibility, adopting 
various methods and offering varying conclusions. Some studies employ quantitative 
methods based on Chinn and Frankel’s (2008) analysis of the internationalization of the 
euro, using the economic conditions of the country issuing a currency—such as its shares in 
global output and trade, its financial market development, its price level and network 
externalities—as the major determinants of the degree of that currency’s 
internationalization, in particular as a reserve currency. One good example is Lee (2014b), 
which forecasts that the share of the RMB in the world’s reserves will rise to around 3 to 12 
percent by 2035.  
 There are also a good number of studies using more qualitative methods. Similar to Lee 
(2014b) mentioned above, a majority of them—including Chen and Cheung (2011), Cohen 
(2012; 2014), Dobson and Masson (2009), Park (2010), Subacchi (2013), Subramanian 
(2011a; 2011b), Wu et al. (2010) and Yu (2014)—address mainly the economic conditions 
of China as the key factors affecting RMB internationalization. Some studies meanwhile 
pay more attention to the political conditions surrounding RMB internationalization. For 
example, Chey (2013) examines China’s international power as a crucial determinant of 
RMB internationalization, while Helleiner and Malkin (2012) analyze the preferences of 
domestic actors in China with regard to RMB internationalization. Eichengreen (2013) and 
Eichengreen and Kawai (2014) meanwhile draw attention to the impacts on RMB 
internationalization of China’s domestic political institutions, such as its authoritarian 
political regime and the weak independence of its central bank, the People’s Bank of China 
(PBOC). In general, these qualitative studies tend to be more cautious about the feasibility 
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of rapid RMB internationalization, although there are some more positive views such as 
those of Campanella (2014), Kirshner (2014) , Subacchi (2013) and Subramanian (2011a; 
2011b). 
 Most of the existing studies, however, irrespective of their differences in methodologies 
or arguments, share two common characteristics. First, in addressing the factors that 
influence the internationalization of the RMB, a majority of them focus largely on the 
economic or political conditions of China itself, the issuer of the RMB. In other words, they 
tend to provide supply-side analyses of RMB internationalization. Second, in analyzing the 
degree of RMB internationalization, most studies do not consider the uses of the RMB in 
individual foreign economies, especially ordinary ones that have neither special political 
relations with China nor international financial centers. They instead rely mainly on either 
the aggregate data at the global level (such as the RMB’s share in total global payments or 
in the world’s reserves) or the data of RMB use in Hong Kong. These two characteristics in 
the studies of RMB internationalization are in fact quite common in the literature on 
currency internationalization in general, as well.2 
 Such analysis of RMB internationalization—and also currency internationalization in 
general—is obviously necessary and desirable in several respects. It has a notable limitation, 
however, in that it largely neglects the demand-side, that is, how individual foreign 
economies actually perceive and respond to RMB internationalization and the Chinese 
government’s policies promoting it. The levels of RMB use differ across countries and, 
further, across sectors within the same country, and are likely to be affected by political and 
                                                 
2 For a comprehensive review of the literature on currency internationalization, see Chey (2012; 2014). 
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economic factors in the countries themselves, as well as those in China. An analysis 
concentrating on the Chinese side alone cannot explain such differences in foreign uses of 
the RMB. The reliance on the aggregate data of RMB use at the global level, or on the data 
of that in Hong Kong, may meanwhile provide an inflated or distorted assessment of RMB 
internationalization, given that Hong Kong accounts for the majority of total global RMB 
use and, moreover, that a majority of those using the RMB in Hong Kong are actually from 
the mainland.3 The appropriateness of treating Hong Kong as a “foreign” region in 
analyzing “internationalization” of the RMB is in fact not clear, since despite its 
administrative independence the city is essentially a part of China.  
It is thus necessary to analyze the uses of the RMB in individual foreign economies in 
order to better understand the determinants of RMB internationalization—and of currency 
internationalization in general—and to in turn better forecast its future. And this requires 
examination of the costs and benefits of RMB use from foreigners’ perspectives, while the 
supply-side analysis tends in contrast to consider the Chinese perspective only in that 
regard.4 To be sure, there are a few studies that do give attention to RMB use in foreign 
economies, even though most of them do not highlight this important aspect. They include 
mainly those examining the co-movements between the RMB and other currencies, based 
                                                 
3 For example, although Hong Kong’s share in global use of the RMB has declined to some extent recently, 
about 74 percent of the world’s RMB payments in December 2013 were still being made there (SWIFT, 
2014). In the meantime, Chinese state-owned banks and large Chinese commercial banks accounted for more 
than 55 percent of all dim sum bonds issued in 2012 and 2013 (Song, 2013).  
4 For a discussion of the costs and benefits of RMB internationalization for China, see Chey (2013: 350-51).  
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mostly on the Frankel and Wei (1994) method.5 These studies also have significant 
drawbacks, however, in concentrating merely on one monetary function of an international 
currency—that is, on its use as a reference currency for exchange rate pegging—while 
overlooking its other important monetary functions such as its uses as a trade invoicing and 
settlement currency, an investment asset or a foreign reserve currency.6 Liao and McDowell 
(forthcoming) meanwhile provide an analysis of the countries that have established bilateral 
local currency swap arrangements with China. But such currency swap arrangements are 
actually closer to means for promoting RMB internationalization, rather than being 
indicative of RMB internationalization per se. 
 In an attempt to fill in the gaps left by such critical shortcomings in the literature, this 
study provides a demand-side analysis of RMB internationalization, focusing on the use of 
the RMB in the ordinary foreign economy of Korea. It examines the use of the RMB in 
Korea and addresses the factors that affect it, analyzing both economic and political ones. 
Its findings are expected to provide valuable insights as to how RMB internationalization is 
likely to proceed in the future, thus ultimately dealing with the salient question of how the 
supply-side efforts by China to promote RMB internationalization have actually been 
received by ordinary foreign economies. Given that most studies of currency 
                                                 
5 A majority of these studies—including Fratzscher and Mehl (2011), Ito (2010) and Subramanian and Kessler 
(2012)—make bold claims that a RMB bloc has already been formed in East Asia, suggesting that the 
international monetary system has now been transformed into a multipolar currency one. A few studies such 
as Kawai and Pontines (2014), however, foresee continuing dominance by the dollar as the primary anchor 
currency in that region.    
6 For the various monetary functions of international currencies, see Chey (2012; 2014).  
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internationalization tend to adopt supply-side analyses, this demand-side research is also 
likely to contribute significantly to the literature on currency internationalization in general, 
and its findings may be applicable to analysis of the internationalizations of other 
currencies as well.  
 
III. Economics of RMB internationalization 
 
This section analyzes the economic aspects of RMB use in Korea, addressing first the trade 
and then the financial sector. It shows that strong market forces favoring RMB use have not 
yet appeared in the country, even despite China’s enthusiastic drive for RMB 
internationalization as well as the close economic relations between the two countries.  
 
1. Obstacles to RMB use in trade 
 
To look at the real economy side first, the use of the RMB as a trade settlement currency in 
Korea remains marginal. As Table 1 shows, the share of total Korean exports settled in the 
RMB amounted to a mere 0.4 percent during the third quarter of 2014. It was also only 1.6 
percent even for exports to China during that period, while the dollar accounted for 95.6 
percent. The share in Korean exports to China settled in the Korean won was actually 
slightly higher in that period, at 1.7%. The import side is even less propitious. The 
proportion of total Korean imports settled in the RMB reached a mere 0.2 percent in the 
same period, while the share for imports from China itself also recorded just 1.0 percent 
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(although that was a historical high), compared to the 95.4 percent share of the dollar. Here, 
again, use of the Korean won for settlement of Chinese imports was higher during the 
period, reaching 1.4 percent.7 It should be emphasized in addition that Korea’s use of the 
RMB in trade settlement has involved almost exclusively trade with China, which accounts 
for 99 percent of its total RMB-settled trade.  
 
Table 1. Shares of the US Dollar and the RMB in Total Korean Trade Settlement, 2007 to Q3 2014 
(%) 
 
 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Q3 
2014 
Exports          
         
   To the world         
       Dollar 82.2 84.3 85.4 85.9 85.7 85.1 85.2 86.2 
       RMB 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.4 
   To China         
      Dollar 97.5 97.3 97.3 97.3 96.9 96.7 95.3 95.6 
      RMB 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.6 1.0 1.6 1.6 
         
Imports         
         
                                                 
7 In fact, the volume of Korean trade settled in the RMB has grown considerably. This rise in RMB use for 
trade settlement is illusory, however, as it began from a very low base of almost zero.   
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   From the world          
      Dollar 80.7 82.0 80.1 81.3 82.5 83.9 84.2 84.5 
      RMB 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 
   From China         
       Dollar  95.0 94.5 93.8 95.3 94.1 94.8 94.9 95.4 
       RMB 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.7 1.0 
Source: The Bank of Korea 
 
 The BOK established a bilateral local currency swap with the PBOC in December 
2008—becoming the PBOC’s first partner for its bilateral RMB-local currency swap 
arrangements—and in December 2012 then introduced a system for using the swap funds to 
provide local currency liquidity for trade settlement. Although this system offers a stable 
RMB liquidity pipeline for Korean firms,8 however, Korean firms have hardly utilized the 
RMB lending available to them through it.  
 This minimal use of the RMB for trade settlement in Korea is in fact a bit surprising. As 
is widely known, the promotion of RMB trade settlement is one of the two major pillars of 
the Chinese government’s strategies to facilitate RMB internationalization, together with 
the development of offshore RMB markets.9 Korea has strong trade ties with China, 
moreover; it became China’s fourth largest trading partner in 2013, while China is Korea’s 
                                                 
8 The BOK established the swap arrangement during the global financial crisis, primarily as a means for crisis 
prevention. Its initial duration was three years, but it has since been renewed twice so that the current 
expiration date is October 2017. Its size was also doubled in 2011, from the initial 180 billion renminbi/38 
trillion won to 360 billion renminbi/64 trillion won. 
9 See Eichengreen and Kawai (2014), Subacchi (2013) and Yu (2014). 
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largest trading partner in terms of both exports and imports, accounting for 25 percent of its 
total exports and 17 percent of its imports in October 2014. Korea has also recorded large 
trade surpluses against China over the past years, especially since 2008 and reaching USD 
63 billion in 2013, implying the strong potential for Korea to accumulate and, accordingly, 
use the RMB. The persistent sluggishness in RMB trade settlement in Korea even despite 
these favorable conditions suggests strongly that market forces favorable to RMB trade 
settlement there remain quite weak. 
 What then explains this surprisingly low level of RMB use in trade settlement in Korea? 
One problem is the limited RMB investment opportunities in the country. In fact, while 
RMB deposits had until not long ago been the only meaningful investment option, Korean 
banks have typically charged high exchange commissions of around 2 to 3 percent for 
RMB deposits, and RMB depositors have as a result actually had to bear losses at most 
banks, reducing their incentives to use the RMB. Yet, as will be examined later, Korean 
financial institutions’ interest in the RMB business has grown significantly of late. The 
problem of the limited RMB investment opportunities may thus be mitigated to some extent 
in the future, although this will still take time.     
There is, however, another fundamental obstacle to the use of the RMB in trade 
settlement in Korea: the high transaction costs, particularly in comparison with those for 
use of the dollar. When Korean exporters use RMB letters of credit (L/Cs), for instance, 
they must pay far higher exchange rate commissions than when using dollar L/Cs. In 
September 2014, in fact, the commissions for three-month maturity L/Cs were 2.7 percent 
for dollar L/Cs compared to 5.7 percent for the RMB (MOSF, 2014b). Moreover, when 
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Korean firms use the RMB for trade settlement with their Chinese trade partners, they 
usually have to handle double exchange risks, both for the RMB and for the dollar, as many 
still have to continue using the dollar for their other trading partners. Firms also have to 
establish operating systems for RMB settlement, which are costly. In short, although RMB 
trade settlement benefits Chinese firms substantially, by reducing their own exchange rate 
risks and foreign exchange-related operating costs, it does not generate meaningful benefits 
to Korean firms but instead generally adds new risks and increases their operating costs. 
Given that trading companies’ choices of trade settlement currencies are determined largely 
by transaction-related rather than speculative motives, high transaction costs are likely to 
seriously hinder use of the RMB in trade settlement.10  
Many Chinese exporters are in fact even willing to offer discounts, of around 3 to 5 
percent, to foreign importers agreeing to use the RMB for settlement, as these exporters can 
then reduce their exchange rate risks and various operational costs (Euromoney, 2013; Lee, 
2012).11 Yet, as indicated, such discounts have failed to provide incentives strong enough to 
                                                 
10 In many cases, in fact, even Chinese firms themselves prefer dollar settlement, in part because they import 
intermediary goods from Korea and export the final products to markets such as the United States (author 
interview with Choi PilSoo, Head, China Research Team, KIEP, September 17, 2013, Seoul). 
11 There are some Chinese firms, particularly importers, that request RMB trade settlement. However, most 
Chinese requests for RMB settlement are not forceful or strong, as the Chinese firms themselves are well 
aware of the underdevelopment of the basic infrastructures for RMB use (author interviews with Kim Woong 
Ryeol; and with Lee Bong-Geol, Chief Researcher, Strategic Market Research Team, Institute for 
International Trade, KITA, September 16, 2013, Seoul). 
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entice Korean firms to increase their RMB use, implying in turn that the costs to them 
stemming from RMB use are substantial.  
A significant decline in the transactions costs of RMB use in trade settlement, especially 
in comparison with those of dollar use, is likely to emerge only after RMB 
internationalization reaches a consequential level, as that will require a substantial maturing 
of the RMB financial markets. It should be stressed in this regard that, even though the 
share of China’s trade settled in the RMB has risen to about 25 percent, more than 80 
percent of China’s RMB trade settlement is in fact with Hong Kong, with all other “real” 
foreign economies together accounting for the remaining 20 percent only (Eichengreen and 
Kawai, 2014: 5).12 
 
2. Fragile foundation of RMB use in finance 
 
The situation of RMB use in the Korean financial sector had until recently not differed 
much from that in the trade sector. For example, while RMB deposits were the only 
available investment product the share in total foreign currency deposits of those in RMB 
had remained below 1 percent until August 2013, as shown in Figure 1. Most Korean 
financial institutions had in fact not been much interested in the RMB business. Their low 
                                                 
12 Moreover, some Chinese companies have even exaggerated the values of their exports to Hong Kong, as 
shown in the USD 13.5 billion gap in October 2014 between the Chinese mainland exports to Hong Kong 
reported by China and that city’s report of its imports from the mainland (Price, 2014). 
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interest had been due in part to their shortages of professional expertise in the business.13 It 
had also, however, been related to the more fundamental problem of their low 
competitiveness in the RMB business vis-à-vis Chinese and global financial institutions, 
stemming partly from their highly restricted access to the Chinese mainland financial 
markets. As a result, many Korean banks had tended to conduct RMB businesses mainly as 
parts of their marketing activities, rather than in accordance with RMB business strategies 
per se.14     
Likewise, although the BOK has begun to hold RMB-denominated assets by 
participating in the Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor (QFII) scheme—which allows 
licensed foreign investors to invest in mainland securities and fixed incomes by switching 
dollars into RMB—and in the China interbank bond market (CIBM), since December 2011 
and April 2012 respectively, the amounts involved have been extremely trivial. The BOK’s 
QFII quota is USD 600 million, and its investment in the CIBM amounts to RMB 20 billion 
(USD 3.2 billion). This together accounts for around only 1 percent of the BOK’s total 
foreign exchange reserves. 
                                                 
13 Author interview with An Yu Hua, Research Fellow, International Finance Division, KCMI, September 11, 
2013, Seoul. 
14 Author interviews with Lee Chi Hun, Deputy Director, Research and Analysis Office, KCIF, Seoul, 
September 6, 2013; Kim Woong Ryeol, Deputy General Manager, Woori Bank Samsungdong Branch (former 
Deputy General Manager, Foreign Exchange Business Department), September 12, 2013, Seoul; and Kim 
Dan Joo, Senior General Manager, Transaction Banking, Standard Chartered Bank Korea, September 25, 
2013, Seoul.  
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 Yet, since the autumn of 2013 a remarkable change in RMB use in the Korean financial 
market has emerged. As shown in Figure 1, the volume of RMB deposits has grown 
suddenly and dramatically since that time, with the RMB’s share in total foreign currency 
deposits rising to a record high of 33 percent in October 2014, while the corresponding 
figure for the dollar has dropped to 58 percent.  
 
Figure 1. Shares of the US Dollar and the RMB in Total Foreign Currency Deposits by Residents in 
Korea (%) 
 
 
Source: The Bank of Korea 
Note: The data for the RMB in April 2013 is missing. 
 
The significance of this recent rise in the volume of RMB deposits should not be 
exaggerated, however, as its sustainability remains quite doubtful. It has been driven 
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largely by arbitrage opportunities arising from interest rate differentials between the Korean 
and the Chinese markets, and not by the indigenous accumulation of RMB in Korea. In 
other words, the recent growth in RMB use in the Korean financial sector has been based 
on unreliable factors.  
 In greater detail, significant interest rate differentials between Korea and China have 
emerged recently, in line with the easy monetary policy in the former country and the tight 
policy in the latter. For instance, the average annual deposit interest rate in Korea, which 
had been 3.8 percent in 2011 and 3.4 percent in 2012, fell below 3.0 percent from February 
2013, remained at around 2.5 to 2.6 percent until June 2014, and then dropped further to 
stand at 2.2 percent in October 2014. The benchmark Chinese interest rate in contrast 
stayed above 6 percent for most of time between January 2011 and October 2014, and with 
the PBOC requiring banks to maintain loan-to-deposit ratios at 75 percent or below it has 
been difficult for them to raise funds in the Chinese markets.   
 This situation has provided lucrative opportunities for Chinese banks operating in Korea, 
as they have been able to enjoy substantial arbitrage profits by borrowing in Korea and 
lending in China, given their abilities to pay higher interest rates to Korean depositors than 
Korean banks and then lend at even higher rates in China. Indeed, Chinese banks have 
generally offered interest rates for RMB deposits about 0.5 to 1.0 percentage points higher 
than those offered by Korean banks for won deposits (Kwon, 2014). The increase in RMB 
deposits in Korea has thus in fact been led mostly by Chinese banks, which confirms that 
RMB internationalization can benefit Chinese financial institutions. This means at the same 
time, however, that even the dramatic rise in RMB deposits has failed to generate strong 
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indigenous interests in the RMB business among Korea banks, as these deposits have been 
taken mostly by Chinese banks. 
 Even more tellingly, the increase in RMB deposits in Korea has not been related to any 
indigenous growth in RMB holdings in the country. Instead, Korean depositors, most of 
them institutional investors such as securities firms and insurance companies, have 
borrowed funds in won, exchanged them for dollars and then sold the dollars for RMB, 
expecting higher interest rate gains from Chinese banks under the low interest-rate 
environment in Korea (Kwon, 2014). In fact, the enduring extremely low level of RMB 
trade settlement implies a low accumulation of RMB in the country.    
 The recent increased use of the RMB in the Korean financial sector thus stands on a very 
fragile foundation. If arbitrage opportunities and related speculative motives disappear, 
RMB use in the country’s financial sector is likely to wane. And in November 2014, when 
the PBOC lowered the interest rate, arbitrage opportunities shrank and the amount of RMB 
deposits in Korea did indeed fall significantly, from USD 21.7 billion the previous month 
to USD 19.8 billion. At that time the share in total foreign currency deposits accounted for 
by the RMB also reversed to a decline, from its upward trend of the previous year.   
      
IV. Politics of RMB internationalization 
 
In contrast to the situation in the markets, however, the Korean government has recently 
provided strong political boost for stimulation of RMB use in the country. It has 
implemented essential infrastructures for the promotion of RMB use, and also adopted 
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various significant policy measures that have helped to generate new vested domestic 
interests supporting greater use of the currency.     
 
1. Initiative from the government  
 
As analyzed above, domestic firms and financial institutions have shown limited interest in 
facilitating RMB use in Korea. Likewise, the Korean government had also not adopted any 
specific policy in accord with the contemporary trend of RMB internationalization until late 
2013, with the currency never having become an important policy issue in government 
circles.15 As a growing number of countries had intensified their endeavors to establish 
offshore RMB centers,16 however, the Korean government began to change its policy from 
early 2014, even in the absence of strong demand from its private sector. And on July 3, 
2014, during Chinese President Xi Jinping’s first state visit to Korea, the Korean 
government finally announced a vision for developing the country into an offshore RMB 
center, entering into agreements with China on five specific measures to this end.  
The five measures are as follow. First, it was agreed to open a direct trading market for 
the won and the RMB in Korea, while the conditions for creating another in China were to 
                                                 
15 Author interviews with an anonymous MOSF official, September 13, 2013, by telephone; and with an 
anonymous BOK official, September 9, 2013, Seoul.  
16 In addition to Hong Kong, London, Singapore and Taiwan, major European countries such as France, 
Germany and Luxembourg have also joined the global race to become offshore RMB centers since early 
2014. 
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be fostered as well.17 Second, a Chinese bank operating in Korea was to be designated as 
the RMB clearing bank in the country.18 Third, Korea was awarded an RMB 80 billion 
quota for the Renminbi Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor (RQFII) program, which 
allows foreign investors to invest in mainland equities and bonds using offshore RMB.19 
Fourth, the two countries agreed to increased investment in the Chinese markets by Korean 
authorities and financial institutions through the QFII program.20 Fifth, it was also agreed to 
encourage the issuance of RMB-denominated bonds in Korea, by financial institutions and 
non-financial firms from Korea and foreign countries including China.21  
In the medium to long term, the government plans to expand the share of Korea-China 
trade settled in the RMB to beyond 20 percent—which will mean the settlement in RMB of 
about one-half of Korea-China trade having final destinations in either of the two 
                                                 
17 Offshore trading of the won is currently prohibited, which was one reason why the won-RMB direct trading 
market was opened in Korea first. 
18 An offshore RMB clearing bank provides the clearing services for RMB transactions outside China through 
its connection with the China National Advanced Payment System of the PBOC. It administers the accounts 
of the banks participating in its clearing system and also offers RMB liquidity, thus operating in practice as an 
offshore branch of the PBOC.  
19 RQFII is expected to strengthen the incentives for holding RMB by expanding RMB investment 
opportunities, which may in turn help to increase RMB use for trade settlement, accordingly vitalizing the 
won-RMB direct trading market as well.  
20 A hike in the QFII quota increases investment opportunities in the Chinese financial markets. 
21 Chinese firms at present need permission from the Chinese authorities in order to issue RMB-denominated 
bonds in a foreign country, while the issuance of RMB-denominated bonds within China (so-called “panda 
bonds”) is allowed for international financial organizations only.  
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countries—and to increase the volume of RMB financial products such as bonds, 
derivatives and deposits to the third largest in the world (MOSF, 2014b).   
 The Korean government has two ultimate goals that it wishes to achieve through the 
establishment of an RMB hub: to maximize the economic gains from “China opportunities” 
and to strengthen the stability of the Korean economy (MOSF, 2014a). First, the 
government perceives China as an “opportunity,” and expects to preoccupy the Chinese 
markets and also to revitalize the Korean economy through establishment of an offshore 
RMB hub (together with the recently signed Korea-China FTA) (Choi, 2014b; MOSF, 
2014c).22 In detail, the building of an offshore RMB center is expected to reduce the 
transaction costs of Korean business with China,23 accordingly boosting the bilateral trade 
and overall interchanges with the country. The creation of an RMB hub is also expected to 
be a turning point for upgrading of the Korean financial industry by generating new 
business opportunities such as RMB trade finance and RMB lending (MOSF, 2014d). 
Meanwhile, the government also judges that the reduction of the country’s reliance on the 
dollar through the diversification of settlement currencies will enhance the stability of its 
economy (MOSF, 2014a).  
                                                 
22 The Korean government also wishes to claim establishment of an RMB hub as a successful case 
exemplifying the “Creative Economy” (Choi, 2014b: 3), a new economic paradigm presented by the current 
Park administration. 
23 For instance, direct won-RMB trading can reduce exchange commissions as the dollar is no longer 
necessary as an intermediary currency. The establishment of an RMB clearing bank also reduces the costs of 
settlement for RMB transactions, as RMB settlement is then possible without having to go through Hong 
Kong (MOSF, 2014d). 
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This top-down approach in Korea in its attempt to build an RMB hub is in fact 
distinctive, contrasting as it does to the bottom-up approaches in most other economies in 
the global race to establish offshore RMB centers. Most of them—including Hong Kong, 
the United Kingdom, Singapore, Germany, France and Luxembourg—do in fact have 
global or regional finance centers.24 Many large financial institutions operating in these 
economies tend to have strong global competitiveness and accordingly keen interest in 
preoccupying the potentially lucrative RMB markets, and have in fact strongly demanded 
that their governments facilitate RMB use in their countries (Hornby and Jenkins, 2013; 
Muk, 2013; Song, 2013). The Korean case demonstrates in contrast that such strong 
demand from the private sector is not always a necessary condition for a government’s 
promotion of RMB use in its country. A government can itself take the voluntary initiative 
for this, in the expectation of its benefiting the overall economy, in other words increasing 
the “national interest.”      
The Korean top-down approach has been fairly effective for establishment of the 
infrastructures necessary to stimulate RMB use, even ahead of any meaningful 
development of an RMB market. For example, the RMB clearing bank began offering its 
services in early November 2014. The direct trading market for the won and the RMB was 
meanwhile launched at the beginning of December that year, making Korea the third 
country, after Russia and Japan, to have opened a local currency-RMB direct trading 
market in its jurisdiction.25 As a result, although Korea is the latest comer in the global 
                                                 
24 Taiwan meanwhile has a peculiar political relationship with China, in addition to their close economic ties. 
25 Russia and Japan opened their markets in December 2010 and June 2012 respectively. 
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competition to build offshore RMB centers, it is now at the very forefront in terms of 
establishment of the essential infrastructures, as only it and the United Kingdom have all of 
the four requirements of a local currency-RMB direct trading market, an RMB clearing 
bank, an RQFII quota and a bilateral local currency swap arrangement with China.  
 
2. Creation of new domestic vested interests 
 
Introduction of the infrastructures necessary for RMB hub establishment does not of course 
ensure its realization. For this, among other factors, there will also need to be domestic 
private actors strongly supportive of RMB use. And in this regard the Korean case also 
illustrates how the government can effectively create new domestic vested interests related 
to RMB internationalization, by generating through its policy measures novel incentives for 
their increased use of the RMB. 
 Korea’s participation in the RQFII scheme, for instance, has granted Korean financial 
institutions—including asset management companies but also banks, securities firms and 
insurance companies—access to Chinese equities and bonds through the use of offshore 
RMB.26 The Korean government has moreover agreed with its Chinese counterpart to allow 
                                                 
26 The Chinese government usually grants RQFII quotas mostly to asset management companies, but has 
agreed with its Korean counterpart to expand Korean participation in the RQFII program to include banks, 
securities firms and insurance companies as well. Korea’s participation in the RQFII scheme may also induce 
overseas RMB funds to flow into the country from countries not having RQFII quotas, which can benefit 
Korean financial institutions with those quotas.  
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Korean banks to enter the CIBM, which accounts for 88 percent of the total value of bond 
trading in China and also provides yields about 1 percentage point higher than the Korean 
bond market (Kim and Ahn, 2014).27 The government plans in addition to increase the 
ceiling on the share of Chinese government bonds in publicly offered funds, from 10 to 30 
percent, and to permit securities companies to engage in foreign exchange lending and 
foreign exchange repurchase agreement trading. The range of financial institutions that can 
do business with the RMB clearing bank is to be expanded as well, to include securities 
companies. All of these measures are expected to strengthen Korean financial institutions’ 
interest in the RMB business by providing them new profit opportunities.  
The permission for issuance of RMB bonds may also promote trading of other RMB 
financial products such as RMB stocks and derivatives, by heightening the incentives for 
holding RMB through the expansion of RMB investment opportunities. The government in 
fact even plans to issue RMB-denominated Foreign Exchange Stabilization Bonds, which 
also means an increase in the share of the RMB in the country’s foreign exchange reserves 
(MOSF, 2014b). To increase RMB investment opportunities further, it also has a plan for 
creation of a private equity market for institutional investors investing in RMB assets.28 
Meanwhile, the establishment of the RMB clearing bank is expected to help with the 
accumulation of RMB in the country by reducing Korean financial institutions’ need for 
                                                 
27 China permits foreign central banks and foreign commercial banks engaging in the RMB trade settlement 
business to participate in the CIBM.   
28 The government also plans to apply for an increase in the QFII quotas of public agencies such as Korea 
Investment Corporation and the National Pension Service (MOSF, 2014b). 
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holding RMB for settlement purposes in foreign offshore RMB centers such as Hong Kong 
(MOSF, 2014b). All of these measures are also expected to generate various new RMB 
business opportunities for domestic financial institutions.  
Although it is still too early for firm assessment, there are some notable early positive 
signs of favorable responses by Korean financial institutions to these government initiatives 
to facilitate RMB use in the country. In early October 2014, for example, Woori Bank 
became the first Korean bank to issue RMB bonds (worth RMB 200 million). A number of 
Korean financial institutions, including asset management companies, securities companies, 
banks and insurance companies, have submitted or planned applications for RQFII quotas, 
competing to launch RQFII products earlier than each other (FSC, 2014). A majority of 
major domestic commercial banks have also joined the competition to attract RMB deposits, 
launching new RMB deposit products offering interest rates higher than those for won 
deposits. In fact, after the government’s adoption of its plan to establish an RMB hub the 
total volume of RMB deposits at five major Korean banks increased significantly, from 
USD 123 million in July to about USD 140 billion in October 2014 (Choi, 2014a). Major 
banks have also acquired permissions to enter the CIBM or are preparing to do so. The first 
RMB loan product in Korea was launched as well, in early December 2014. 
Won-RMB direct trading is meanwhile widely assessed as having enjoyed a successful 
start, since it averaged a volume of RMB 5.4 billion (about USD 880 million) per day in the 
first one month after the market opened, equivalent to about 13 percent of average daily 
won-dollar trading and also more than four times the average daily volume in the yen-RMB 
direct trading market in Tokyo (Lee, 2014a; MOSF, 2015). In order to help create demand 
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for and supply of RMB the Korean government has designated 12 banks as market makers, 
to lead trade pricing by disclosing sale and purchase prices and also provide liquidity, and 
the majority of won-RMB trading during this initial period was done by these banks out of 
intentions to predominate the market or to maintain their statuses as market makers (Lee, 
2014a; MOSF, 2015). This encouraging start of the won-RMB direct trading market is thus 
also attributable largely to the strengthened private interest in its success owing to the 
active government policy to facilitate RMB use in the country.   
 
V. Conclusion 
 
As RMB internationalization has enjoyed an impressive start, the research on it has also 
grown considerably in recent years. However, while the supply side of the RMB 
internationalization issue has been addressed to a substantial extent, the demand side 
remains significantly underexplored. Such a bias in favor of supply-side analysis has in fact 
been common in the study of other international currencies as well, and so is not limited 
particularly to that of the RMB. In addition, when assessing the global level of RMB 
internationalization much of the research has focused mainly on use of the RMB at the 
aggregate global level or that in Hong Kong, while neglecting that in ordinary foreign 
economies even though the growth in use in those economies is crucial to the ultimate 
success of RMB internationalization. This study has attempted to fill these important gaps 
in the literature by providing an in-depth analysis of the use of the RMB in Korea, an 
ordinary foreign economy, from both an economic and a political perspective.     
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 With regard to the economics of RMB internationalization, this research has found that 
sustainable indigenous market forces favorable to RMB use remain weak in Korea, despite 
China’s enthusiastic attempts to promote RMB internationalization over the recent few 
years as well as the strong potential in Korea for growing RMB use. Although use of the 
RMB in the Korean financial sector has recently grown substantially, that has been due 
mainly to speculative motives, an unreliable base for persistent RMB use, and has not been 
associated with any indigenous buildup of RMB holdings in the country. Regarding the 
politics of RMB internationalization, however, this study has also clearly illustrated that 
political factors can have significant impacts on RMB use in a country, and largely positive 
ones in the specific case of Korea. In that country, the main initiative for the boosting of 
RMB use has originated from the government itself, which has implemented the major 
infrastructures necessary for stimulation of RMB use, even in the absence of strong demand 
for this from the private sector. Even more tellingly, the government has through its policy 
measures been able to encourage the emergence of new domestic vested interests 
supporting RMB internationalization, especially in the financial sector, by offering them 
opportunities to profit from growing RMB use.  
 These findings together ultimately suggest that politics in foreign economies—along 
with market forces and economic and political conditions in China itself—do matter for the 
future of RMB internationalization. Especially in this early stage of RMB 
internationalization, the intrinsic economic attractiveness of the RMB as an international 
currency remains quite weak, in particular compared with the dollar, the current dominant 
international currency. In this situation, in order for RMB internationalization to take off 
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successfully, policy support from the governments of foreign countries, as well as from the 
Chinese government itself, appears to be crucial, particularly in the case of ordinary foreign 
countries having neither special political relationships with China nor global financial 
centers. These findings are expected to offer a valuable stepping stone for additional 
development of the study of RMB internationalization and, going further, of currency 
internationalization in general. They may also provide significant policy implications for 
China with regard to its future strategy for further stimulation of RMB internationalization.   
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